The choice of content in an advertising message is a critical managerial decision. In this paper, we investigate under what circumstances the …rm prefers to include a product attribute-based appeal in its ad (i.e.: "No Hassle Rewards") versus an appeal with no direct information on product attributes (i.e.: "My Life, My Card, American Express.") Since attribute-based messages are meant to inform consumers of the product's high value, here we focus on how the content decision is impacted by the product's quality. One intuitive hypothesis is that the high-quality product would choose to emphasize its attributes. However, the limited bandwidth of advertising media implies that a …rm can only communicate about a limited number of attributes in its message. Hence, an attribute message may not di¤erentiate a truly excellent product from an average one. We show that there can exist an equilibrium where a high-quality …rm chooses to produce messages devoid of any information on product attributes in order to encourage the consumer to engage in search, which is likely to uncover positive information. Hence, an uninformative message can serve as a signal of con…dence on the part of the …rm. An average …rm that imitates this strategy risks to lose its customer in cases when she uncovers negative information as part of the search. Therefore, an average …rm may choose to engage in an attribute-based appeal, despite the fact that this perfectly reveals its type. While most of the previous literature has focused on the decision to advertise as a signal of quality, here we show that message content, coupled with consumer search, can also serve as a credible signal of quality.
For the past forty years, economists and marketers have studied how advertising can help consumers learn about products. The information that advertising provides can be direct, such as the existence of the product or its price (for example, see Grossman and Shapiro 1984) . The information can also be indirect, where the mere fact that the …rm advertises signals an experience good's high quality (see Nelson 1974 and Milgrom and Roberts 1986) . The latter is known as the "money-burning" theory of advertising.
One of the important and surprising take-aways of the money-burning theory is that it is the level of spending that signals the quality of the product, and not the content of the message.
That is, content is irrelevant for conveying information on product quality. However, a quick look at trade publications such as Ad Age and Ad Week con…rms our intuition as consumers that content is an important driver behind advertising persuasiveness, and one to which …rms pay close attention. In this paper, we revisit the result that advertising is irrelevant for signaling quality and investigate whether and how advertising content can convey information on product quality in a rational framework.
Speci…cally, we ask when a …rm would choose to mention speci…c product attributes as opposed to making vague claims in its advertising. We will refer to a campaign that emphasizes product attributes as "attribute-based" advertising. By de…nition, this type of advertisement contains "hard" information (Tirole 1986 ) about product bene…ts and, hence, the claims are credible and veri…able. In contrast, following Bagwell and Ramey (1994), we will refer to a campaign that does not emphasize any particular product attributes as "uninformative." Of course, the term "uninformative" may be somewhat confusing since even vague claims may contain information to the consumer. For example, a message with no speci…c claims may simply make a consumer aware of the product or reinforce the product's image. Here we focus on the signaling value in the …rm's decision not to include attribute information in its communication. Hence, the term small subset of its product's attributes. It is impossible for the …rm to accurately communicate all of the features associated with its product in a 30-second commercial or a print ad (Shapiro 2006 , Bhardwaj et al. 2008) . Hence, if a …rm claims to be good on a few selected attributes, its advertising will be indistinguishable from the advertising of the …rm that is only good at those attributes. If, on the other hand, the …rm makes no attribute-based claims and engages in uninformative advertising, its advertising will be indistinguishable from the advertising of a …rm that cannot deliver high quality on any attributes.
For example, consider the digital camera Sony Cybershot DSCW300 which was ranked number one by Consumer Reports in 2009 in the subcompact digital camera category. This camera is high-quality on a large number of attributes; the Sony web site lists over 30 product features for this product. Clearly, Sony Cybershot cannot emphasize all of its superior attributes in a 30-second commercial. On the other hand, if Sony decides to focus on one of its attributes, such as high image quality, it cannot distinguish itself from a camera such as Panasonic Lumix DMC-FS15, which happens to have high image quality but is dominated by Sony on the versatility dimension.
If Sony instead chooses to emphasize the versatility dimension, then it cannot distinguish itself from Nikon Coolpix S230, which is equally versatile but is dominated by Sony on image quality. 3 The argument above highlights the point that the …rm may not be able to entirely resolve the uncertainty about its product through advertising alone under limited bandwidth in advertising communication. However, a consumer who is uncertain about the product's features following exposure to advertising may take actions to resolve this uncertainty: she can conduct her own search to discover the product's quality prior to purchase by engaging in activities such as reading online product reviews or talking to her friends. Therefore, the high quality …rm may actually prefer to encourage the consumer to search since it is con…dent that the information uncovered will be positive. We show that there exists an equilibrium where uninformative advertising serves as an invitation to search. In contrast, an average …rm that imitates this strategy risks losing its customer in cases when she uncovers negative information as part of her search. Hence, an average …rm may choose to engage in an attribute-based appeal, despite the fact that this perfectly reveals its type. Therefore, in a situation with limited communication bandwidth and active consumers, advertising with no information on features may serve as an invitation for the consumer to search.
In this paper, we formalize the above argument and develop a framework to analyze simultaneously the choice of advertising content (whether to emphasize attributes or not) and the pricing decisions of a monopolist. By taking into account the fact that consumers may choose to search, which serves as an additional source of noisy information about product quality, a …rm can signal its product quality through its advertising content.
The paper is organized in the following manner. In Section 2, we relate our paper to the existing literature in economics and marketing. Section 3 presents the model set-up. We discuss the model results in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
Literature Review
In this Section, we review the literature that applies to the primary issue in this paper: the role of advertising content in signaling product quality. Most models that consider the quality-signaling role of advertising do not …nd that advertising content can credibly signal quality (Nelson 1974 , Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984 , Milgrom and Roberts 1986 , Bagwell and Ramey 1994 , also see Bagwell 2007 for a comprehensive review). In these models, the high-type …rm can credibly signal quality only through conspicuous money burning. In contrast, we show that content may play a role in signaling quality above and beyond public money burning.
Several previous papers have focused directly on advertising content. For example, Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) allow the …rm to announce the existence of the product or its price through advertising. Simester (1995) and Shin (2005) examine the credibility of price claims in advertising. However, neither of these papers considers content other than prices as a potential signal on quality. Two recent papers consider the role of content (other than prices) in signaling quality. Anderson and Renault (2006) look at the possibility of the …rm informing consumers about product attributes through advertising content in a context where consumers are imperfectly informed about product characteristics. 4 Although consumers always learn their true match value before buying, the possibility of a hold-up problem by the …rm implies that advertising that provides either match or price information alone is optimal in di¤erent cases. Anand and Shachar (2007) show that advertising content can enable quality signaling by in ‡uencing beliefs on the o¤-equilibrium path.
In addition, the …rm can signal its unobservable quality through actions other than advertising. Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) show that warranties such as money-back guarantees can signal the …rm's unobservable quality, and Wernerfelt (1988) shows that umbrella branding can signal the quality of a new product. Our model closely relates to Bhardwaj et al.(2008) . In the latter, the high-quality …rm prefers to allow the consumers to choose what features they want to inquire about (a "buyer-initiated" selling format) since it is con…dent about the high quality of all of its features. On the other hand, the low-quality …rm prefers a "seller-initiated" selling format, where the …rm chooses which features to highlight as part of its selling process. Hence, the buyer-initiated format can serve as a signal of quality. Although our paper explores a very similar problem in the advertising context, our work di¤ers from Bhardwaj et al. (2008) Formally, the model we present here is most closely related to the literature on countersignaling 4 Sun (2009) also investigates the monopolistic seller's incentive to disclose the horizontal matching attributes of a product. Kuksov (2007) studies the incentives of consumers to reveal or conceal information about themselves to others through brand choices in the consumer matching context. Yoganarasimhan (2009) …nds that …rms sometimes prefer to conceal information to increase the social value of its product. (Teoh and Hwang 1991 , Feltovich et al. 2002 , Araujo et al. 2008 , Harbaugh and To 2008 . 5 In contrast to the standard signaling models where high types send a costly signal to separate themselves from the low types, in countersignaling models the high type chooses not to undertake a costly signaling action. People of average abilities, for example, get more education than bright people in labor markets (Hvide 2003) . Mediocre …rms reveal their favorable earning information while both high quality and low quality …rms tend to conceal their earning information in …nancial market (Teoh and Hwang 1991) . Feltovich et al. (2002) formalize this intuition and show that in the presence of an external signal, the high type may pool with the low type while the medium type prefers to separate. Their motivating example is one of a job seeker, who has not seen his letters of recommendations, deciding whether or not to reveal his high school grades during an interview.
While the model we present is a countersignaling model in that the high and low types pool on the same actions, the advertising context makes it necessary for us to de…ne a model that is di¤erent from extant counter-signaling models. First and most importantly, while in the previous countersignaling models (for example, Feltovich et al. 2002, Harbaugh and , the player is assumed to always receive the second signal, in our model the consumer only receives this additional information if she chooses to search after observing the price and content of the advertising message; that is, we endogenize the presence of a second signal, which plays a critical role in enabling the countersignaling equilibrium. Second, we also allow price to be a potential signal, which was not an issue in the earlier models. The decision to search is of course also impacted by the price that the …rm charges.
Although we have focused on rational explanations for uninformative advertising, there are a number of behavioral-based explanations for this phenomenon (see Carpenter et al. 1994 , Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy 1984 , Kardes 2005 , and Scott 1994 . These models emphasize the importance 5 A similar phenomenon is known in the sociology literature as the middle-status conformity theory: the high and low-status players may deviate from conventional behavior, while the middle-status players conform to social norms (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) . These models, however, do not involve a signaling story. of both the cognitive and the emotional response to advertising. Since we predict that …rms may choose to engage in uninformative advertising even in the absence of these psychological forces, our work complements these explanations.
Model
The game consists of one …rm and one consumer. There is an informational asymmetry about the quality of the monopolist's product: the …rm knows its product's quality while the consumer must infer the product's quality from signals that she receives from the …rm as well as information that she may obtain on her own. To model quality, we use the concept of a discrete match between the product and consumer (Wernerfelt 1994 , Bhardwaj et al 2008 . That is, we equate quality with the product's ability to frequently meet the customer's needs, regardless of the exact circumstances.
In particular, suppose that the product consists of two attributes: 2 fA; ag; 2 fB; bg, where the capital letter stands for higher quality on that dimension. There are two possible states of the world, 2 f1; 2g, where either state is equally likely a priori. If = 1, only attribute impacts the customer's experience. Similarly, if = 2, only attribute matters. Neither the customer nor the …rm can predict the future state of the world. For example, suppose that Bob is considering buying a jogging stroller for his newborn daughter. If he ends up using the stroller mostly for running in his neighborhood, then it would be important for him that the stroller has good shock absorption. However, if he also ends up often driving with his child to the mall, it is important that the stroller be able to fold compactly in order to …t in the trunk of his Jetta. Since this is Bob's …rst child, he cannot accurately predict which mode will be more likely. Similarly, when consumers purchase a personal computer, they do not know whether the CPU speed or the memory is the more important attribute.
The product utilities in the two states of the world are
We normalize = 0 for simplicity. We also assume that an attribute is equally likely to be high or low quality, and that there may be correlation between levels of the two attributes:
where 0 < < 1. Hence, there are three possible types ( ) of products based on the quality levels of the attributes: 2 fH; M; Lg = ffA; Bg; fA; bg or fa; Bg; fa; bgg, with the a priori probabilities of ( 2 ,1 , 2 ) respectively. 6 A priori, the H-type product delivers utility V to a customer with probability 1, the M -type product delivers utility V with probability , and L always delivers 0 utility. Note that while the exact utility levels are not important to our results (for example, we can re-normalize > 0 to better capture the reality that even inferior products yield some utility to the consumer), the rank-ordering of products from the consumer's perspective is important. Hence, all else equal, a consumer would prefer H to M , and M to L, which in turn implies that L type wants to imitate H and M ; M type wants to separate itself from L and imitate H, and H wants to separate itself from M and L.
The …rm can communicate to the consumer through advertising. We assume that the cost of advertising is zero. 7 We also assume that the …rm must advertise in order to inform the consumer of its product's existence. These two assumptions imply that the …rm always chooses to advertise.
This allows us to focus on the role of content in advertising above and beyond the well-known e¤ect of money burning where the …rm can signal that it is high type by engaging in excessive advertising activity. Moreover, while our model primarily deals with the quality-signaling role of advertising, this assumption acknowledges the importance of the awareness role of advertising.
The …rm's action space consists of two possible advertising choices. First, the …rm can choose an ad that centers on the product's attributes, an "attribute-based" advertising. Here, we impose a truth-telling assumption: the …rm cannot claim to be high quality on an attribute on which it 6 Note that if = 1 (perfect positive correlation), only fA; Bg and fa; bg products exist, and if = 2=3, all products are equally likely. 7 The results of the model are not qualitatively a¤ected by the presence of an advertising cost, as long as it is not too large.
is in fact low quality. While we acknowledge that advertisers often exaggerate their claims, the Federal Trade Commission does require that "advertising be truthful and non-deceptive" and that all claims must have a "reasonable basis." 8 To capture the reality of the limited bandwidth inherent in a communication medium such as TV, we allow the …rm to transmit information about only one attribute -either or : a = a j , where j 2 ( ; g. In practice, a product contains a large number of features. However, given the constraints on the time available for communication as well as the limited cognitive resources available to the consumer for processing advertisement information (Shapiro 2006 ), the …rm is only able to communicate about a small subset of these features (Bhardwaj et al 2008) . We can extend this two-attribute model to a more general multi-attribute setting. If the …rm chooses to emphasize more than one attribute in its ads, one can think of the set of advertised features as , and the set of the unadvertised features as ; for example.
In contrast to attribute-based advertising, a …rm can choose not to emphasize any particular attribute: a = a 0 . We refer to this as "uninformative" advertising. In Table 1 we summarize the possible types and the actions available to them. 
Following Meurer and Stahl (1994), we assume that the consumer can costlessly obtain information on the …rm price, p, after observing an ad. Otherwise, a hold-up problem can occur (see Wernerfelt 1994) . After the consumer receives the advertising message and observes the price, she can choose to invest a cost c in order to discover the quality of the product. After incurring this cost of search, the consumer obtains extra noisy information about the product quality. This may involve searching for online reviews (Chevalier and Mayzlin Pr(sj ) = ; where 2 fL; M; Hg (1)
The …rm knows that the consumer can obtain this extra information with the above probabilities, but does not observe whether the consumer actually chooses to search for this extra signal, let alone what signal the consumer ultimately receives if she chooses to do so. The signal space of each type has the same support so that no signal is perfectly informative. Also, Equation (1) implies that the higher quality …rm is more likely to generate favorable information. This amounts to a MLRP (Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property) assumption over the signal space across types. In other words, positive news (s) is really "good news" regarding the …rm's quality (Milgrom 1981 ).
For example, suppose that after viewing an ad for Sony Cybershot camera, Bob posts an inquiry about this camera on a digital photography forum. Since this camera is excellent, Bob is likely to receive a positive recommendation. Bob is less likely to receive a positive review for Nikon Coolpix, which is more likely to disappoint a random consumer. This example illustrates several important points. First, the information the consumer receives through search is potentially richer than the information she can obtain after viewing an ad. The binary signal above can be viewed as a summary of all the product attributes. Second, even an excellent product may generate a negative signal: there is noise in the signal due to factors such as individual taste idiosyncrasies or promotional chat generated by …rms, for example. However, a better product is more likely to yield a positive signal (Mayzlin 2006) . Hence, the additional signal is informative but noisy.
After the consumer receives information regarding the product (through either advertising, prices, or own research), she forms a belief on the quality of the product. Here, we signify by the consumer's information set, and by ( ) the consumer's belief. In particular, ( ) =
The consumer's information set ( ) includes the observation of advertising (a), price (p), and consumer's own search (s) if that takes place. That is, if the consumer performs own search, then = fa j ; p; sg for a …rm that advertises an attribute, and = fa o ; p; sg for a …rm that employs uninformative advertising. If, on the other hand, no consumer search takes place, then = fa j ; pg for a …rm that advertises an attribute, and = fa o ; pg for a …rm with an uninformative advertising.
The consumer then decides whether to purchase the product at its posted price based on the posterior belief on its quality: (a; p; s) in the case of consumer research, and (a; p) in the case of no search. We assume that a consumer who is indi¤erent between purchasing and not purchasing the product chooses to purchase it. The timing of the model can be summarized as follows: 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
We start with the consumer's problem -the consumer observes advertising and price, (a; p), and decides whether to search for additional information before making a …nal purchase decision -and then turn to the …rm's strategy. If the consumer is uncertain about the …rm's type even after observing the price and advertising, she can either (1) forego search for additional information and make a purchase decision based on her belief, (a; p), which we abbreviate to , or (2) search for additional information s at a cost c. In the absence of additional search, the consumer buys the product if and only if E(V j ) p 0: That is, she buys the product if the prior belief is relatively favorable or the price is relatively low. The consumer will search for additional information if
Note that the consumer undertakes a costly search only if her decision to purchase di¤ers depending on the outcome of the signal (i.e., there must be value in the information received). In other words, when the consumer chooses to search, she buys only if the signal is high (s = s). The conditions for when the consumer chooses to search are speci…ed in the following Lemma:
2. If E(V j ) p < 0, the consumer will search for additional information i¤
Proof. See Appendix
Equations (3) and (4) (3) and (4)) is c. The marginal bene…t is represented by the right hand side of these equations and di¤ers depending on the price. If E(V j ) p 0, the consumer would choose to buy the product based on the prior alone in the absence of an additional signal. Hence, the marginal bene…t of search is in preventing purchase in the case when the signal is negative (s = s). On the other hand, when E(V j ) p < 0, the consumer would not purchase a product in the absence of an additional signal. Therefore, the marginal bene…t of search is in enabling the consumer to purchase the product in the case when the signal is positive (s = s). Note that if the conditions in either Equation (3) or Equation (4) hold, then Equation (2) holds -the consumer chooses to search before purchase.
One implication of Lemma 1 is that given a belief, the consumer chooses to search for additional information only if the product's price is within a certain range (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix for more details). Hence, we can identify the range of prices and beliefs that ensures the existence of consumer search. For example, Figure 2 illustrates the consumer's decision to search for extra information when the consumer is not certain whether the …rm is type H or type M . This can occur if a consumer observes an attribute-based ad, which implies that the product is not L-type, but could be either H-type or M -type. In the Figure, the prior belief H (the probability that the product is H-type prior to engaging in search) is graphed on the x -axis (where 0 H 1).
Figure 2: Consumer Beliefs and Optimal Response Behaviors
For a given belief ( H ), if the price is low enough (p < p( H )), the consumer prefers to buy the product without further search (see point D in Figure 2 ). As we mentioned in our discussion of Lemma 1, at relatively low levels of p, i.e., p E(V j ), the value of additional search is in preventing purchase when the outcome of search is negative, which in this case is captured by p E(V j ; s).
Hence, when p is low, the marginal bene…t of search is not high enough to justify its marginal cost.
At any point on the convex curve p = p( H ), the consumer is indi¤erent between buying without search or engaging in further search. At a higher price (p < p( H ) < p), the consumer prefers to search (see points B and C). That is, here the consumer incurs a cost c to obtain an additional signal and purchases if and only if the outcome is positive, s = s, since E(V j ; s) > p and E(V j ; s) < p.
On the other hand, at any point on the concave curve p = p( H ), the consumer is indi¤erent between no purchase and engaging in further search, and at p > p( H ) the price is so high that the consumer surplus obtained in the case when the outcome of search is positive (E(V j ; s) p) is not high enough to justify the cost of search (see point A). As we can see from the Figure, V (see the Lemma 2 in the Appendix). That is, search will not occur under any belief if the search cost is su¢ ciently high.
What is the potential role of search in our model? As we can see from the Figure above, given the prior belief H , the possibility of consumer search allows the …rm to charge a higher price (see point B, for example), as compared to a situation where no consumer search is possible, in which case the maximum the …rm can charge is p = E(V j ). That is, the fact that the consumer can undertake an action to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the …rm's quality enables the …rm to charge a higher price. In this sense, the …rm may want to invite the consumer to search. We can think of this as the bene…t of search to the …rm. However, while the possibility of search increases the upside of a transaction through higher price, it also introduces the possibility that no transaction occurs in the case when the consumer receives a negative signal, which may happen even for the highest type since the signal is noisy. We can think of the no transaction outcome as the cost of search (or alternatively as the risk inherent in search) to the …rm. Since the probability of a negative signal di¤ers across di¤erent types, search is di¤erentially costly to di¤erent quality types. Therefore, a …rm that "invites" the consumer to search through an advertising action may be able to signal its quality by credibly demonstrating its con…dence in the outcome of the search.
Since we want to model an active consumer who can choose to engage in her own search, we focus on the region of the parameter space where the cost c is low enough such that search is a feasible option to the consumer. 9 Assumption: Search cost is low enough such that c
We next consider the …rm's strategy in more detail. We focus on pure strategies only. Hence, each type chooses an advertising and price combination -(a ; p ), where 2 fL; M; Hg. There are a number of equilibria that are possible, ranging from full separation to pooling (see Table 2 ).
For example, in HM equilibrium, the H and M types send out the same advertising message and post the same price, while L-type di¤ers in at least one of these actions:
the product is L-type. On the other hand, if she observes (a HM ; p HM ), she is uncertain whether the …rm is H-type or M -type. Her decision to search for extra information depends on her prior belief as well as the price p. While the advertising action choice is discrete (an advertising action can be either attribute-based or uninformative), the price variable is continuous, which implies that a continuum of prices is possible for each type of equilibrium.
We can quickly rule out two potential equilibria: fully-separating equilibrium (F S) and a semi- 
separating equilibrium where M and L pool (M L). Note that full separation implies that the consumer can simply infer the product's type by examining the prices and the advertising campaign. 
. This is a contradiction; a fully separating equilibrium does not exist in our model.
Proposition 1 A fully separating equilibrium does not exist.
The result above illustrates the importance of search in enabling signaling in our model. Consumer search cannot occur in a fully-separating equilibrium since the consumer has no uncertainty about the …rm type after observing price and advertising. The assumption that there are more types (3 types) than possible advertising actions (2 possible actions: attribute vs. uninformative ad) results in at least some pooling between di¤erent types in advertising. The remaining question is then whether price can di¤erentiate between types in the absence of search by the consumer. As is illustrated from the proof above, price alone cannot signal quality since our model does not have any of the elements that would ordinarily enable price to be a signal of quality, such as di¤erential costs or demand. Instead, as we show below, it is consumer search (coupled with price) that enables signaling in our model. 10 Similarly, we can show that a semi-separating equilibrium, M L, where M and L types pool cannot exist. In M L, it must be the case that itself from all lower-type players (which in this case is L only) through advertising, it prefers to do so. Hence, an equilibrium where M and L pool does not exist.
Proposition 2 ML equilibrium does not exist.
The remaining three equilibria candidates (HM L, HM , and HL) can be categorized into two types: one in which H separates from M (HL), and one in which H pools with M (HM L, and HM ).
As is the case for any signaling model, we have to deal with the technical issue of specifying the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. There are two main approaches to dealing with this. The …rst is to assume a particular set of beliefs following a deviation (see, for example, McAfee and Schwartz 1994). While this method is often used, it is vulnerable to the criticism that any speci…c set of chosen beliefs is, by de…nition, arbitrary. The second approach is to start with an unconstrained set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs, but then narrow it using an existing re…nement. The strength of this approach is that it imposes some structure on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs -a belief that 1 0 A signaling result requires that the single-crossing property be imposed across types. In existing models, singlecrossing property is exogenously given through di¤erential costs, demands or pro…ts from repeat purchases (Milgrom to eliminate unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs. The idea behind this re…nement is roughly as follows. Consider a set of best responses associated with a particular out-of-equilibrium belief.
Suppose that H-type bene…ts from the deviation under a bigger set of best responses than L-type.
Moreover, this is the case for all possible beliefs. D1 then requires that the consumer does not believe that the deviating type is L. More generally, suppose that in deviation A 1 = (a; p), type 0 makes higher pro…t than in equilibrium under a strictly bigger set of best responses from the consumer than type does. D1 then requires that the consumer does not believe that the product could be type .
Note that unlike the Intuitive Criterion, D1 does not require that L-type must not bene…t from the deviation under any possible belief. Instead, it requires that the set of consumer's best responses, which are based on the consumer's beliefs, should be strictly smaller than that of H-type.
We show that our equilibrium is supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs that not only survive the Intuitive Criterion, but also even the stronger D1 re…nement. We discuss the D1 criterion and its application in the Appendix.
Uninformative Advertising Can Signal High Quality
We …rst consider the equilibrium that is the core of this paper: HL equilibrium. In this equilibrium, H and L types pool on uninformative advertising and
whereas M type engages in attribute-based advertising and, therefore, perfectly reveals own type to the consumer (a M = a j ; p M = V 2 ). HL is a countersignaling equilibrium in that the high and low types pool together on the same action (Feltovich et al. 2002) . Surprisingly, in this equilibrium the type with the most to say (H-type) chooses a message devoid of any information on product attributes.
Proposition 3 A semi-separating HL equilibrium where the consumer chooses to search after observing (a 0 , p HL ), exists if:
Here,
Proof. See the Appendix
Under the assumption that search is feasible for the consumer (c
V ), the consumer chooses to search for additional information in HL equilibrium as long as the equilibrium price is not too low or too high:
, the consumer's best response is to buy without search, and if
, the consumer's best response is not to purchase). Under consumer search, the …rm can charge a quality premium based on the reduced consumer uncertainty. That is, in the case when the consumer receives good news (s = s), she is willing to pay a higher price compared to the price she is willing to pay for M -type. Hence, H-type may prefer to extend an invitation to search to the consumer by pooling with L-type on uninformative advertising.
In equilibrium, all types prefer their equilibrium strategies to the optimal deviation. Of course, the optimal deviation depends on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. To show existence, we assume the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: L = 1 for all (a 0 ; p 6 = p HL ) and H = 0 for all (a j ; p 6 = V 2 ).
Below we show that this belief is indeed reasonable. Given this, the …rm's non-deviation conditions are the following:
The belief we assumed above is maximally pessimistic in the sense that if a deviation is observed, the consumer assumes that it comes from the lowest type capable of that action. However, it is easy to show that more optimistic beliefs would yield the same outcome. 11 The Proposition above demonstrates the existence of the HL equilibrium with consumer search.
We next show that this equilibrium can survive the D1 re…nement (and the Intuitive Criterion as well).
Proposition 4 A semi-separating HL equilibrium where the consumer chooses to search after observing (a 0 , p HL ), exists and survives D1 if:
where
. 1 1 For example, suppose that, as before, L = 1 for all (a0; p 6 = p HL ) and H = 0 for all (aj; p p HL ), but H = "(c)
for all (aj; p > p HL ). It is easy to see that for "(c) small enough, the consumer would not purchase the product if she observes the deviation (aj; p > p HL ) since p HL > V 2
. Hence, the …rm's non-deviation conditions would remain the same.
Here, we only consider those beliefs that are consistent with D1. In Lemma 3 in the Appendix, we show that the belief we assumed above, L = 1 for all (a 0 ; p 6 = p HL ) and H = 0 all (a j ; p 6 = V 2 ), satis…es the properties imposed by D1. Note that in addition to the conditions we had in Proposition 3, Equation 8 also includes a lower limit on price which is necessary in order for the equilibrium to survive D1. 12 Since not all of the conditions are binding, the constraints reduce to the ones given in Proposition 4.
To summarize, we have shown in Proposition 3 that a counter-signaling equilibrium where the best and the worst types pool on uninformative advertising can exist. In other words, advertising content can signal quality. In Proposition 4 we show that this equilibrium survives the D1 re…ne-ment. This demonstrates the robustness of HL equilibrium since D1 eliminates equilibria that are supported by unreasonable out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
Based on the results of these two Propositions, when do we expect to see this equilibrium?
From Equation (7), we can see that in order for HL with consumer search to exist, it must be the case that H is su¢ ciently large and M is su¢ ciently small. Here H-type prefers to pool with L-type on uninformative advertising rather than pursue an attribute-based strategy which perfectly signals that the …rm is not L-type. Since the additional signal associated with each type is noisy, after an uninformative ad and own search, the consumer may mistake a H-type …rm for a L-type. Therefore, the risk H bears by pooling with L must be relatively small ( H is large)
such that H-type prefers this to the certain outcome of pretending to be M -type by engaging in an attribute-based ad. Moreover, when H is large relative to L , the consumer is willing to pay a higher price following an uninformative ad and good news (s = s) since she is con…dent that the product is H-type and not L-type. Hence, when H is large, not only is the probability of a transaction high, but the price charged can increase. This is the source of H's con…dence in 1 2 We …nd that if p HL is low enough, then there exists a deviation A1 = (aj; p dev > p HL ) such that D1 imposes H (A1) = 1. This of course would destroy HL. Hence, in order to rule this out, we need the additional constraint
. See the Appendix for more details.
extending the invitation to search to the consumer. On the other hand, M -type prefers to separate itself from L-type rather than pool with it. This can happen only if the additional signal cannot e¤ectively separate between M and L types (in other words, M is small). Hence, M lacks H's con…dence and prefers not to mimic H-type because the probability that it may be misjudged as L-type is too high. That is, while H-type is willing to relinquish control in its communication strategy (by engaging in uninformative advertising with an uncertain outcome following consumer search), the M -type prefers the lower risk attribute-based strategy.
Finally note that in this HL equilibrium, all types make a positive pro…t. In particular, L-type is able to extract rents that arise due to the consumer's mistakes as a result of search. However, L's pro…t is strictly lower than those of H and M -types:
In particular, as the noise associated with L's signal decreases ( L decreases), L's pro…t decreases.
As we see from the discussion above, consumer search is the core mechanism which enables signaling in equilibrium. In fact, we can formally show that this equilibrium does not exist without consumer search:
Proposition 5 A semi-separating HL equilibrium without consumer search does not exist.
Proof. See Appendix
Without consumer search, the …rm is constrained to charge a relatively low price due to consumer's uncertainty about product quality. The maximum price that the H and L-type can charge in equilibrium such that the consumer chooses not to search is strictly less than V 2 when the search cost is su¢ ciently low. Hence, H-type would prefer to deviate in order to signal that it is not type L, which of course destroys this potential equilibrium.
Other Equilibria
In the preceding Section, we show that H-type can signal its quality by extending an invitation to search (through uninformative advertising) to the consumer. Can there be other equilibria where M as well extends this invitation? As we show below, there indeed can be equilibria where M , as well as H, extends an invitation to search. In the HM L full pooling equilibrium, all types engage in uninformative advertising and post the same price, and the consumer chooses to search in equilibrium. Note that while an uninformative advertising is an invitation to search in HM L, it is not a signal of higher quality. In contrast, in the HM semi-separating equilibrium, an attribute ad can serve as an invitation to search, while an uninformative ad reveals that the …rm is L-type.
We show that these other equilibria exist only if M is high enough -the mediocre product is willing to extend an invitation to search only if it is fairly certain that the outcome of search will be positive. In other words, if M is low or the mediocre product is not con…dent in the outcome of the search process, only the HL countersignaling equilibrium exists.
We …rst turn to the full pooling equilibrium, HM L, where all types engage in the same type Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
The …rst result is very similar to the result we obtain in Proposition 5. If the higher types pool with the lowest type, and no search occurs, the price that is charged in a potential equilibrium is too low to prevent a deviation. On the other hand, the …rm may be able to charge a high enough price such that the consumer would choose to search after observing uninformative advertising. The mediocre …rm would choose this strategy only if it is fairly con…dent about the positive outcome of search -i.e., M is high enough. In this equilibrium, search still allows the …rm to charge a high price due to the decreased uncertainty. However, since M is high, the possibility of search is not a credible threat to the M type and, hence, M prefers to pool with H (and L) as opposed to reveal its quality. All types extend an invitation to search through uninformative advertising, but this invitation to search does not signal quality.
The …nal remaining equilibrium is the semi-separating HM equilibrium. In this equilibrium, H and M types pool on attribute advertising and price: a = a j , where 2 fM; Hg, p = p HM . The fact that the higher types engage in an attribute-based communication allows them to separate themselves from the L-type: a L = a 0 . 14 The consumer, of course, can choose to search following (a j ; p HM ) in order to further di¤erentiate whether the …rm is H-type or M -type. In this semiseparating equilibrium, and in contrast to HL, both H and M types choose to emphasize their strong attribute: the …rm which has anything positive to say about its product chooses to do so.
In this sense, this equilibrium is a very intuitive one.
Proposition 7
Suppose that search cost is low enough such that c
1. A semi-separating HM equilibrium without consumer does not survive D1.
2. A semi-separating HM equilibrium, where the consumer chooses to search after observing
Moreover, this equilibrium survives D1.
Proof. See the Technical Appendix.
The …rst result in Proposition 7 mirrors our earlier results. An equilibrium without consumer search does not survive D1 if cost of search is low enough. This is again due to the fact that without search, the …rm is constrained to charge a relatively low price. 15 On the other hand, HM equilibrium where the consumer chooses to search can exist. As was the case for HM L, here M is willing to extend an invitation to the consumer to search. However, search follows an attribute-based ad as opposed to an uninformative ad in HM L. The consumer searches in order to di¤erentiate between the H and M types. Note that while both of these types deliver relatively high value to the consumer, the pooling price in equilibrium is high enough so that the consumer prefers to undertake the costly search in order to further resolve the uncertainty. 16 Hence, the condition of low search cost, c
; ensures that the consumer searches for additional information in equilibrium.
As we can see from the condition on the search cost above, here plays a role in the decision to search. Recall that is the correlation between attributes, which in this equilibrium translates to a prior belief about the product's type following a j since P (Hja j ) = P ( = Bj = A) = . The consumer chooses to search only if the search cost is low enough relative to the bene…t that can be obtained through seeking additional information; i.e., resolving the uncertainty. Therefore, if is either close to 1 or to 0, there is little remaining uncertainty on whether the …rm is H-type or M -type following a j , which in turn implies that search would not arise in equilibrium unless the search cost is also close to zero. Hence, depending on the magnitude of the search cost c and the 1 5 We show that there exists a deviation A1 = (aj; p dev > p HM ), such that following this deviation the consumer believes (based on D1) that the …rm must be type H. Therefore, under this re…ned belief, the consumer chooses to purchase without search. This, in turn, destroys the HM equilibrium without search since both types prefer to deviate to (aj; p dev ) rather than play the equilibrium strategy. 1 6 Note that while the exact expressions for the conditions on the search cost as well as the price bounds di¤er across HM and HM L since they pool on di¤erent actions, the basic conditions remain the same: (1) the cost search is small compared to H M , (2) the price is in a certain range which ensures that the consumer searches, and (3) correlation , HM equilibrium with search may or may not exist.
In summary, for the HM L and HM to exist, M must be high enough. In the equilibria where H and M types pool, the probability that M receives a positive signal following search must be high enough so that M is willing to pool with H in price and advertising. By pooling with a higher type and charging a high price, as is the case for HM and HM L, M -type loses control over the consumer's …nal inference since in both of these equilibria the consumer chooses to search for additional information. On the other hand, in the HL equilibrium, by revealing its type, M faces lower risk since the consumer has no uncertainty. This decrease in uncertainty, however, comes with a lower upside potential since in this case M cannot charge more than Finally, we show that when H is large and M is low, HL is the only equilibrium that survives the D1 re…nement.
Proposition 8 Under D1, HL equilibrium is unique when H is su¢ ciently large and M is su¢ ciently small such that, 1. The conditions for HL hold (see Proposition 4),
Moreover, this region is non-empty.
Proof. See the Appendix:
Discussion
When would we expect to observe high H and low M , the prerequisites for the existence (and uniqueness) of HL? Note that this parameters represents the probability of positive news for product following search by the consumer. One factor that may moderate the relative size of M is the propensity to discuss negative experiences with others. For example, Godes and Wojnicki (2009) show that experts may be less likely to share their negative experiences since it sends a negative signal about their ability to choose a high-quality product. Hence, we would expect that in a category with a higher proportion of experts, word of mouth about a mediocre product may be skewed to be more positive (higher M ), while a category with fewer experts would be less biased (lower M ). Similarly, the average price level of the category may impact the level of M . That is, a bad experience with a luxury car may prompt an instant posting on a blog, whereas a negative experience with a toothpaste may not inspire as much outrage. Again, this would imply that a higher average category price would lead to a lower M . Finally, in a category where consumers have high expectations about product quality, a product which is extremely high-quality on some attributes but not others (M type) is more likely to have a lower M . Another moderating factor on the H and M parameters is the relative quality of H-type and M -type products. That is, in reality, a product is composed of multiple attributes. Though in our model we assume only two attributes for simplicity, we can think of as the set of attributes that the …rm emphasizes in an ad, and as the remaining set of attributes. Moreover, suppose that there are n attributes in a product, and H-type is high quality on h attributes (n > h), while M -type is high quality on m attributes (n > h > m). In this set-up, when the …rm emphasizes its k high quality attributes in an ad, the consumer is still uncertain about the quality of n k attributes which are not advertised. Here we would expect H to be increasing in h, and M to be increasing in m. That is, depending on the size of n; h; and m, H and M should vary.
In summary, we show that in the case of limited bandwidth, two types of equilibria are possible: one in which H and M types pool (HM L; HM ), and another one in which H and L types separate (HL). In the latter, the superior …rm (H) extends an invitation to search by pooling with the terrible product (L) in its communication strategy in order to distinguish itself from the mediocre product (M ). The mediocre product, on the other hand, prefers to perfectly separate itself from the terrible product rather than risk being confused with it. Hence, the invitation to search through uninformative advertising can be a signal of quality -advertising content can signal quality. Our …ndings emphasize the importance of modeling the decision to search (with its costs and bene…ts) since search is crucial in enabling this separation across neighboring types. A superior …rm chooses uninformative advertising as an invitation to search since it is con…dent that consumers will realize its high quality on their own. When the …rm is not con…dent about its quality, which is the case for the mediocre …rm, it prefers to make a product claim in order to separate itself from the terrible …rm.
Conclusion
We show that advertising content -whether the advertisement is uninformative or attribute-based -can be a credible quality signal under the realistic assumptions of (1) limited bandwidth of communication, and (2) the possibility of consumer search following the consumer's exposure to the advertisement. We show that this desire to signal one's quality may result in the surprising phenomenon that a …rm with the most to say may choose not to make any "hard" claims at all. This withholding strategy may be rational in that vague claims can be made by either the superior or the terrible products, which necessitates search for further information on the part of the consumer. In our opening example, American Express Card is con…dent that a consumer who engages in own search will …nd out about its superior service 17 . This con…dence allows it to engage in uninformative advertising in favor of making any hard claims. Capital One, on the other hand, which is weaker on some attributes, is not con…dent that search will distinguish it from a truly terrible product and does not want to undertake the risk of search. Instead, it chooses to emphasize one of its attributes in order to separate itself from a truly terrible product. Finally, the First Premier Bank Credit Card, which engaged in uninformative advertising, can be seen as an example of a low quality product: in 2008 Consumer Reports listed it as one of three cards from which its readers should stay away. 18 In conclusion, the combination of advertising content and consumer search enables the …rm to signal its quality even in the absence of a money-burning e¤ect. When there exists limited bandwidth in advertising communication, the high quality …rm can signal its quality by extending an invitation to search through uninformative advertising to the consumer. The consumer search (which is determined endogenously in the model) is crucial in enabling this type of equilibrium.
While most of the previous literature has focused on the decision to advertise (the mere fact that the …rm is willing to burn its money) as a signal of quality, we show that message content, coupled with consumer search, can also serve as a credible signal of quality.
There can be, of course, a lot of di¤erent explanations for the existence and e¤ectiveness of uninformative advertising (in particular, image advertising), and we do not wish to claim that our explanation is the only possible theory for this phenomenon. Nevertheless, we o¤er a novel explanation for uninformative advertising, one that to our knowledge is the …rst one that assumes consumer rationality.
Appendix 1 Proof of Lemma 1
The consumer will search if and only if EU (search) = Pr(sj )[E(V j ; s) p] c EU (no search) = max(0; E(V j ) p). Therefore,
Next we show that f = g at p = E(V j )
= Pr(sj )E(V j ; s) Pr(sj )p Pr(sj )p + Pr(sj )E(V j ; s)
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
D1 Re…nement
We apply D1 (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) to eliminate unreasonable out of equilibrium beliefs.
Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p 452), we de…ne ( ) to be the equilibrium pro…t of type . We also de…ne the set of mixed strategy best responses of the consumer, 2 ( 2 = f 21 ; 22 ; 23 g = fPr(purchase without search); Pr(no purchase); Pr(search)g) to a deviation by the …rm, A 1 = (a; p), such that type strictly prefers A 1 to the equilibrium strategy:
Note that the consumer's best response depends on her belief, (
Similarly, we de…ne a set of consumer's best responses such that the …rm is indi¤erent between deviating and playing the equilibrium strategy.
The criterion D1 puts zero probability on type if there exists another type 0 such that
Using Lemma 1, below we derive the set of consumer's mixed best responses, M BR( (A 1 ); A 1 ):
(b) Consumer will purchase without search:
(c) Consumer mixes between search and purchase without search: 2 = f 21 ; 0; 1
(c) Consumer mixes between search and no purchase: 2 = f0; 22 ; 
Moreover, for a given j H ; consumer chooses to search i¤ p j (
2. Consider the case where the …rm engages in uninformative advertising, A 1 = (a 0 ; p) and the
). There exists a consumer belief ( 0 ) under which search is a best response for the consumer if c
Moreover, for a given 0 ; consumer chooses to search i¤
We can easily show that
, there exists a belief under which the consumer chooses to search after observing a j and a 0 .
HL Equilibrium Proof of Proposition 3
Here we show that HL equilibrium with consumer search exists if c <
We …rst turn to the consumer's problem. As we can see from Lemma 2, in order for the consumer to search in equilibrium, it must be the case that c
. In addition, on the equilibrium path, the probabilities that the …rm is H-type and L-type following (a 0 ; p HL ) are
Hence, in order for the consumer to search in equilibrium, the price must be in the appropriate range: p HL 2 [
Next, we need to ensure that all types prefer their equilibrium strategy to an optimal deviation.
To show existence, and as we discuss in the body of the paper, we impose the following out-ofequilibrium belief: L = 1 for all (a 0 ; p 6 = p HL ) and H = 0 for all (a j ; p 6 = which is trivially satis…ed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We examine the restrictions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs that are imposed by D1. First, we assume that p HL < V 2 M . We will return to this assumption below and con…rm that it is indeed the case in equilibrium. . If the consumer observes A 1 = a j ; p dev , 3. Consider A 1 = a j ; p dev ; and p j p dev p j .
First, we assume that
4. Consider A 1 = (a 0 ; p dev 6 = p HL ) and p 0 p dev p 0 .
First, consider the case p dev < p HL , which implies that X H = X M = X L = ?: Also,
. Moreover, we can see that when M p HL <
Hence, when M p HL <
(1 H )
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
We show this result by contradiction. Suppose that there exists an HL equilibrium without (1 H )V +c 1 2 (1 H )+ , this equilibrium similarly does not exist. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
The …rst condition ensures that HL exists (see Proposition 4). The remaining equilibria that survive the D1 re…nement are HM with search and HM L with search (see Proposition 6 and Proposition 7).
We …rst turn to HM . Note that in order for the consumer to search in equilibrium, p HM p HM when c < 
